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Abstract
We compare di¤erent modes of extending liability to third parties motivated by the prob-
lem of …rms exerting too little preventive care if damages are likely to exceed their equity.
In our model, …rms can be …nanced by equity, bank debt or publicly traded debt. There is
a moral hazard problem about the choice of care that can be mitigated through stochastic
monitoring. We show that the optimal allocation can always be implemented by a liability
regime of full “…nancial responsibility”, that is mandatory liability coverage for total harm
that can be ful…lled either by an insurer or by a lender. This result is in contrast to related
models which …nd liability below the level of harm optimal. The di¤erence is due to the inclu-
sion of safety monitoring. The superiority of full …nancial responsibility is reinforced by the
fact that other liability regimes lead to distortions in the capital structure. The robustness
of the mechanism vis-a-vis risk aversion is con…rmed.
Key words: lender liability, compulsory insurance, choice between private and public
debt, limited liability e¤ect.
JEL classi…cation: G32, K13, K32.
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1. Introduction
A …rm strictly liable for any harm done will generally not choose the e¢cient care level if
there is a possibility that the …rm goes bankrupt. Damages large enough to put the …rm into
bankruptcy - like environmental and product liability or health risks - will be undervalued
because some of the losses of the victims will go unclaimed under conventional strict liability.
The care level will typically be too low in this case (limited liability e¤ect).1 For …rms facing
considerable liability risks, levering up the capital structure may become an e¤ective evasion
strategy.2
Extending liability is a natural regulatory response. Attempts to extend liability are most
advanced in the United States where managers, shareholders, holding companies and notably
secured creditors are among the groups which have been held liable under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA).3
Several varieties of extended liability have been proposed. The form which is at the center
of our analysis is …nancial responsibility. Financial responsibility means that the operation
of hazardous plants and other businesses is only authorized if the operator shows proof that
all liability claims are covered either by an insurance company, by a lender, or by another
su¢ciently solvent party. The principle of …nancial responsibility is legally mandated in the
US (under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act; RCRA), but the application seems
insu¢cient and distortions are likely.4 Financial responsibility is also made possible by law in
some European countries, notably in Germany (under the Environmental Liability Act 1990)
and in the Netherlands (Environmental Control Act 1979 and Soil Protection Act 1994), but
we are not aware of current enforcement e¤orts.
Two other varieties of extended liability have gained prominence in practice and in the
academic discussion. Under lender liability, creditors of an insolvent injurer can be held liable.
Under mandatory insurance, hazardous plants need to show proof of insurance coverage in
order to be able to operate, just as mandatory liability insurance is prescribed in other areas
of torts, like automobile insurance. As far as we were able to gather reliable information on
the current situation in the US, …nancial responsibility appears to be insu¢ciently enforced
as of now. In practice, e¤orts to enforce extended liability seem to be mostly con…ned to
legal action against identi…able deep pockets like bank lenders, after an accident occurred.
That is, the current legal practice in the US can be likened to lender liability. In Europe,
1See e.g. Summers (1983) and Shavell (1986). Beard (1990) and Posey (1993) extend the discussion to
care costs that reduce the coverage of the defendant. Kornhauser and Revesz (1990) discuss the problem of
multiple tortfeasors.
2Ringleb and Wiggins (1990) indeed …nd that …rms attempt to avoid liability by shielding assets through
divestiture. Their analysis suggests that the incentive to avoid liability led to a 20% increase in the number
of small corporations between 1967 and 1980.
3See Buente, Crough and Conlan (1996) for an overview.
4Boyd (1996) identi…es important loopholes that weaken …nancial responsibility under RCRA.
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extended liability is not yet applied in practice. At the level of the European Union, however,
proposals are currently being discussed in the wake of initiatives in favor of strict liability for
environmental torts.5
If information were perfect, then any of these three forms of extended liability would
obviously be fully e¢cient.6 In practice, however, there are pervasive problems of asymmetric
information between investors and …rms, e.g. because investors have di¢culties to correctly
anticipate environmental risks (hidden information) or cannot monitor the care level perfectly
or without su¤ering large costs (hidden action). Under these circumstances, three questions
arise: The …rst question is whether extending liability to third parties is superior even if the
agency costs caused by asymmetric information are taken into account. The second question
is whether lender liability, mandatory insurance or …nancial responsibility should be applied.
The third question is whether liability payments should di¤er from total harm or not.
Our analysis focuses on moral hazard with respect to the …rm’s level of care. We assume
that the moral hazard problem can be mitigated through monitoring. We demonstrate that
…nancial responsibility for total harm leads to an allocation arbitrarily close to the …rst best
if the contract between the …rm and the lender or insurer assuming residual liability is chosen
optimally to reduce the agency costs to the minimum. Since it leads to the …rst best, full
…nancial responsibility is preferable to all competing proposals; in general, those cannot avoid
ine¢ciencies with respect to the care level and the capital structure.
Our …nding is in striking contrast to earlier literature on extended liability: It has been
repeatedly argued (see references below) that, in the presence of moral hazard, liability should
be kept below the level of harm because of the following trade-o¤: Raising liability towards
the level of harm gives better incentives to internalize the social costs of negligent behavior,
but comes at the expense of increasing agency costs.
The optimality of full liability in our analysis is mainly explained by the fact that we
introduce an element that has been largely ignored in the previous discussion about extended
liability, namely safety monitoring. Safety monitoring seems to be a reasonable extension
in the discussion, since big industry insurers and banks possess and actively deploy consid-
erable competencies in screening environmental risks, in safety consulting and in auditing.
We demonstrate that increasing agency costs can be avoided if safety monitoring is applied
appropriately. We show that an insurance or loan contract containing both penalties and
bonus payments in response to the …ndings of monitoring solves the limited liability problem.
The superiority of …nancial responsibility over competing forms of full liability, notably
lender liability, is a consequence of our treatment of possible distortions in the capital struc-
ture which is more encompassing than in the preceding literature. Previously, only the
debt-equity choice of …rms has been considered. By contrast, we allow for a choice among
5See Bergkamp (2000) for a discussion of the Commission’s White Paper on Environmental Liability.
6See e.g. Shavell (1987).
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equity, private debt and publicly traded debt. Distinguishing between private or bank debt
and publicly ‡oated debt7 seems more realistic in the light of recent trends towards disinter-
mediation. It captures the fact that in practice lender liability can only be implemented for
large lenders who are geared up to have a special relationship with the borrower. This is, for
example, the current legal practice under RCRA.
As long as …rms can escape lender liability by issuing publicly traded debt, and as long
as such debt issues can be designed to enjoy priority over liability claims - this is for instance
easily possible under current US law by issuing secured debt8 -, lender liability alone cannot
solve the limited liability problem. Lender liability will then eliminate distortions between
equity and private debt, but at the expense of creating new distortions between insider …nance
and outsider …nance, since only large creditors can be held liable. Hence, we propose …nancial
responsibility for total harm not only because safety monitoring can eliminate agency costs,
but also because all other liability regimes lead to capital structure distortions.
A number of recent papers have addressed lender liability and compulsory insurance in
models with moral hazard. The seminal contribution is Pitchford (1995), who shows that
extending liability beyond the manager’s wealth reduces the care level of the manager and
hence social welfare. The reason is that with lender liability and competitive capital markets,
the manager voluntarily commits her total wealth as collateral if damage occurs. If liability
is extended the manager’s wealth, the only e¤ect is an increase in interest rates or insurance
premia, which will lower the manager’s incentives to avoid environmental harm. Boyer and
La¤ont (1997), and Boyd and Ingberman (1997), and Endres and Lüdeke (1998) con…rm
Pitchford’s conclusion that it might be second best optimal to adjust damages below total
harm wtth somewhat di¤erent arguments. In clear contrast to these articles, we argue that
full …nancial responsibility leads to the …rst best allocation under plausible circumstances.
In the ensuing discussion, it has been pointed out that Pitchford’s result crucially depends
on the assumption that the manager has all of the bargaining power (via competitive capital
markets). It has been shown that if the lender has the bargaining power, then the interest
rate decreases and the manager’s e¤ort increases in the lender’s liability.9 Balkenborg (1997)
7This distinction has received a lot of attention recently in the theory of corporate …nance, see e.g. Diamond
(1991), Rajan (1992), Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994), and Bolton and Scharfstein (1996).
8Basically, in U.S. bankruptcy proceedings, claims of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for the
clean-up of toxic property are ranked as administrative expenses. That is, they are junior to secured claims,
but senior to all unsecured claims; see in re. Chateaugay Corporation 994 F.2d 997 (2nd Circuit Court 1991);
in re. Hemingway Transport, Inc., 993 F.2d 915 (1st Circuit Court) and Pennsylvania vs. Conroy, no. 93-3284
(3rd Circuit Court 1994).
9See e.g. Newman and Wright (1992), Heyes (1996) and Demougin and Fluet (1999). Shavell (1997)
demonstrates that the optimal level of extended liability might well be above total harm (punitve damages)
if the principal has the bargaining power.
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demonstrates that the optimal level of lender liability is increasing in the creditor’s bargaining
power. Demougin and Fluet (1999) show that there might be excessive incentives for monitor-
ing, because the principal uses monitoring as a means to reduce the agent’s information rent,
and Feess (1999) argues that this e¤ect is aggrevated if lenders are subject to the negligence
rule rather than strict liability. In contrast to this discussion, full …nancial responsibility is
optimal in our analysis independent of the bargaining power, and no excessive monitoring
occurs.
Our model is also related to literature discussing mandatory insurance to avoid environ-
mental harm. Jost (1996) emphasizes the bene…ts of compulsory insurance if the regulator
will approve production only if an e¢cient insurance contract has been signed. Shavell (1986)
argued earlier, on a less optimistic note, that the overall e¤ect of mandatory insurance is am-
biguous, because it prevents socially ine¢cient projects. Polborn (1999) argues that this does
not happen if the agent’s wealth is high enough to pay the insurance premium in advance, a
result that is not con…rmed in our model when the manager is wealth-constrained.
There is empirical evidence in support of our concern that the capital structure and
notably the choice between bank debt and bond …nancing might be distorted if extended
liability is insu¢ciently comprehensive. Kroszner and Strahan (1998) …nd that lenders are
hesitant to be found closely involved in their borrower’s day-today operations, because of
concerns about future tort liabilities.10 In a previous theoretical paper (Feess and Hege
(2000)), we had already visited this question, but following the conventional assumption
that agency costs are increasing in the induced level of care, we found that reduced rather
than full liability is optimal. By contrast, the inclusion of a genuine microeconomic model
of safety monitoring in the present paper leads to a very di¤erent conclusion. Lewis and
Sappington (1999) is the only prior article …nding that full …nancial responsibility is optimal,
but this is driven by their assumption that the level of harm provides a publicly signal for the
unobservable e¤ort level. In our analysis, no such public signal, but only private monitoring
e¤orts exist.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is laid out in Section 2. Section 3 com-
pares the di¤erent liability regimes and demonstrates the e¢ciency of …nancial responsibility.
Section 4 extends the analysis to risk aversion. Section 5 concludes.
2. The Model
We consider a risk-neutral manager who needs to raise I to …nance a project. There is some
risk that the project causes environmental damage with a monetary loss of D. Harm D
occurs with probability p(e) > 0 which depends on the manager’s unobservable care level e.
As usual, e expresses at the same time the cost of care. We assume that p0 < 0 and p00 > 0, so
10See also Gompers and Lerner (1999) for similar results in a somewhat di¤erent context.
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accidents can be prevented by more care, but at a decreasing rate. It follows that the socially
optimal level of care requires that marginal costs equal the marginal reduction in expected
harm:
p0D = 1 (2.1)
We denote by e¤ the optimal care level saisfying (2.1). The manager decides not only
on the care level e, but also on the capital structure of the …rm. All …nancial variables
are expressed as present values when the …nancial structure is chosen. The manager has
unobservable initial wealth W that can be used as equity E. Besides, she can only use debt
instruments to …nance I: Capital markets providing debt …nancing are competitive. Let ID
be the part …nanced by debt and E = I¡ID be the part …nanced by equity, where E ·W . To
analyze the impact of di¤erent liability regimes on the capital structure, we assume that the
corporate value (i.e. present value of future cash ‡ows) R in case there is no environmental
harm depends not only on the project itself, but also on the choice of the capital structure.
Following the standard static-trade-o¤ model usually applied in corporate …nance, we assume
that there is a unique optimal debt level I¤D that maximizes the corporate value R(ID), i.e.
Hence, R(I¤D) ¸ R(ID) for all ID 6= I¤D. We do not enter into an explicit, and cumbersome,
modelling of the impact of ID on R, since we are only interested in potential distortions in
the capital structure caused by liability rules. the only thing requirement is the assumtion
that there is an optimal capital structure, which could for example be explained by the static
trade-o¤ theory.11 We assume W ¸ E¤ = I¡ I¤D to ensure that the optimal capital structure
is feasible with the available equity.
We also allow for the manager’s choice between bank debt and publicly traded debt. In
case of publicly ‡oated debt, there is a large number of dispersed bond investors contributing
towards the investment ID, while in the case of bank debt, there is only a single bank lender.
To capture the di¤erence as easily as possible, we assume that bank debt has costs cB, and
that public debt has costs cP . Either form of debt can be more cost e¢cient, i.e. cB T cP .
To simplify the notation we assume that min(cB; cP ) = 0. Again, we do not model explicitly
the factors in‡uencing the optimal debt structure. Instead, we treat cB and cP as given to
focus on possible distortions caused by liability rules. We assume that mixing public and
private debt is never better than either pure bank debt or public debt …nancing.
If harm D arrives, then the …rm is strictly held liable by the court for damages in the
amount of L · D.12 We assume that damages have strict priority over equity, but that
11The basic idea of the static trade-o¤ model ist that the tax burden is decreasing in the level of debt,
whereas expected bankruptcy costs are increasing. As both costs are re‡ected in the …rm’s net present value,
there is an interior optimum for the optimal debt level ID. See originally Myers (1977) or any standard
textbook on corporate …nance.
12We do not consider negligence rules since e is unobservable.
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debt is secured and is prior to damages. The manager’s wealth not invested into the …rm is
protected through limited shareholder liability.
In view of the insolvency problem, we consider three liability regimes:
(i) (Un-extended) Strict Liability: liability is neither extended to third parties nor is
insurance coverage required to get a permission for the project.
(ii) Lender Liability without …nancial responsibility: strict liability is extended to bank
creditors. Lender liability does not extend to public creditors, since transaction costs would
be prohibitively high.
(iii) Financial Responsibility: As explained in the introduction, this means that the
investment is permitted only if the manager shows proof that L is fully covered by either her
own wealth, an insurance company, or a lender.
Thus, the problem of the regulator is to choose ex ante among these three liability regimes
and to de…ne total liability payments L · D. Insurance is available on a competitive insurance
market.
Next, we turn to the possibility of monitoring. In our model, monitoring means that
lenders and insurers may perform costly environmental audits on the …rm to make sure that
a level of care written into the debt or insurance contract is maintained. For simplicity,
we assume that the e¤ort level can perfectly be estimated if monitoring is performed. We
denote bym the costs of monitoring, and by q the probability that the …rm is audited. Hence,
expected monitoring costs are qm. To avoid double moral hazard problems, we assume that
the monitor can credibly commit to q. Furthermore, we assume that banks and insurers have
the same monitoring technology.13 Finally, duplication of auditing e¤orts is ine¢cient, i.e. if
both the bank and the insurance company audit, then their total costs are higher than if one
of the two were to assume all the auditing.
If the manager and a third party (insurer or lender) agree upon a positive level of moni-
toring, then total social welfare can be written as
W +R(ID)¡ I ¡ p(e)D ¡ e¡ ci ¡ qm. (2.2)
Equation (2) shows that social surplus depends on the capital structure ID, the debt
structure expressed by ci, i = B;P , the care level e and the monitoring probability q. Clearly,
the investment should only be carried out if expression (2.2) is positive.
13 In reality, either banks or insurance companies might have the superior auditing technology. On the one
hand, insurance companies have great experience in environmental monitoring, but on the other hand, it has
been common bank practice for years to assess the environmental risks of potential borrowers.
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3. Analysis of Liability Regimes
3.1. Strict Liability
In this section, we analyze the outcome, and demonstrate in particular distortions to e¤ort
choice and capital structure, if there is no extended liability. Note that there will be no
distortion between private and public debt, since lenders bear no risk.14 Suppose the regulator
chooses L = D. The manager’s expected utility US15 is
US =W +
£
1¡ p(eS)¤ £R(ISD)¡ ISD¤¡ES ¡ eS . (3.1)
If there is no environmental harm (which happens with probability 1¡ p), the manager
gets R(ISD) ¡ ISD. Otherwise, the …rm goes bankrupt. Note that ISD matters only if the
…rm can repay its debt, while ES and eS have to be borne in any case. It follows that the
manager’s utility maximizing capital structure is given by
dR
dISD
= 1. (3.2)
Since the …rst best debt level I¤D is given by
dR
dI¤D
= 0, it follows immediately that the debt
level is too high, because debt is prior to damages and hence the part of harm borne by
victims is the higher the higher the level of debt.
Moreover, the FOC for e¤ort is
¡ dp
deS
£
R(ISD)¡ ISD
¤
= 1. (3.3)
Hence, eS < e¤, and the distortion is increasing in the level of debt. This is the well-known
limited liability e¤ect: the safety level is too low whenever harm exceeds the …rm’s solvency,
and this is aggravated by the incentive to increase the leverage. Finally, the manager has an
incentive to overinvest, since the investment should only be undertaken if social welfare as
expressed in equation (2) is positive. Under strict liability, however, the manager undertakes
the project if US is positive. Hence, ine¢cient investment is undertaken if
£
1¡ p(eS)¤ £R(ISD)¡ ISD¤¡E ¡ e > 0 > R(I¤D)¡ I ¡ p(e¤)D ¡ e¤: (3.4)
Inequality (3.4) shows that ine¢cient investments are likely for projects with large acci-
dent risk D.16 Note that monitoring plays no role under un-extended strict liability, because
14Recall that the only source of risk is the liability risk, and that claims D are junior to debt.
15Subscripts S denote the case with strict liability only.
16Nothing could be gained by setting L > D (punitive damages), because the manager goes bankrupt
anyway if an acciddent happens. The e¤ects of punitive damages would be somewhat more complicated if we
allowed for di¤erent levels of harm, some of which above and some of which below the insolvency threshold;
see Innes (1999), and Lewis and Sappington (1999).
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(i) the manager has no incentive to insure the environmental risk and (ii) the lender does
not care about the risk because debt is prior to damages.
We summarize:
Proposition 1. Under strict liability, the care level is too low and leverage is too high.
There is overinvestment into projects with considerable accident risks. Monitoring does not
take place.
Proof: Immediate from calculations above. ¥
3.2. Financial Responsibility
Under …nancial responsibility, the regulator grants permission for the project if and only if
the manager shows proof that all damages L are fully covered. Let us assume for a moment
that the manager has enough wealth to self-insure all liability risks. It is then straightforward
that full liability (L = D) is optimal. Since both capital markets and insurance markets are
competitive, in the end the manager bears not only the expected costs of environmental harm,
but also all costs caused by moral hazard or monitoring. Hence, it is in her self-interest to
use W as a liability deposit to avoid the agency costs. It follows that …nancial responsibility
leads to a …rst best without monitoring, and without distortions in the capital structure,
whenever the manager’s initial wealth is su¢ciently high.17
We can therefore immediately turn to the more interesting case where the manager’s
net wealth is insu¢cient for self-insurance (W + R(I¤D) ¡ I < D). Let us …rst ignore the
possibility of monitoring. In this case, it it is again in the manager’s self-interest to pledge
her total wealth, so that the insurer or bank (henceforth insurer for short) has to pay only
L¡W¡R(I¤D)+I if an accident happens. This implies that the insurer requires an insurance
premium r if its participation constraint is to satis…ed. ForW given, r is strictly increasing in
L to ful…ll the insurer’s participation constraint. Moreover, the manager’s incentive to avoid
the accident is strictly decreasing in r, since r reduces her net return only if no accident
occurs. It follows immediately that extending the liability beyond the manager’capacity to
self-insure reduces her e¤ort. This is exactly the result derived by Pitchford (1995) who
concluded that liability should be restricted to W .
Next, we demonstrate that the situation changes fundamentally if safety monitoring is
taken into account. The role played by monitoring in our model is in fact that of a bonding
device. With extended liability, then the manager will ultimately bear a fraction of damages
L that exceeds her net wealth W + R(I¤D) ¡ I: She will have to pay higher risk premia
for credit or higher insurance premia. It is again in the manager’s self-interest to minimize
17To avoid misunderstandings, it should be noted that using W as collateral for liability payments does not
mean that W must be fully paid in as equity (only a fraction E is).
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total expectd costs borne by her and the insurer since insurance markets are competitive.18
These costs consist of expected liability payments pFL, e¤ort costs eF and monitoring costs
qFmF .19 For any e¤ort level eF that the manager wishes to implement (i.e., to commit to via
monitoring), she wants to minimize qFmF , but she needs to tkae her own incentive constraint
into account. For this, the di¤erence in her expected pro…ts if she complies to the contractual
e¤ort level eF and if she deviates needs to be maximum. This can be reached by a contract
with the following elements:
(i) An (unobservable) e¤ort level eF , a monitoring probability qF , and an insurance
premium rF .
(ii) If the manager is monitored and found compliant with the contractual safety standard
(e ¸ eF ), then she receives a bonus payment of ¦F > 0 regardless of whether an accident
occurs or not.
(iii) If the manager is found to have deviated from the contract (e < eF ), she loses
everything regardless of whether an accident happens or not.
(iv) If the manager is not monitored, she loses everything.
Under these circumstances, the insurance premium rF and the the bonus payment ¦F are
interdependent and given by the insurer’s participation constraint. Assuming that the man-
ager chooses the contractual e¤ort level in equilibrium, the insurer’s participation constraint
determining rF is
(1 + rF )IFD + q
FmF = IFD + p(e
F )
£
L¡ (W +R(IFD)¡ I)¡ rF )IFD
¤
+ qF¦F + qFmF . (3.5)
The insurer gets (1 + rF )IFD plus a fee covering her expected monitoring costs q
FmF as
up-front payments. On the right hand side, expected costs …rst consist of the investment
IFD. Second, in case of an accident, the manager pays as much as possible and the insurer
the remainder. Furthermore, if the manager is found compliant with the contractual safety
standard, the insurance company pays ¦F . Finally, she has monitoring costs mF in any case,
so that equation (3.5) expresses the zero-pro…t condition.20 This can be rewritten as
¡
1¡ p(eF )¢ rF IFD = p(eF ) £L+ I ¡R(IFD)¡W ¤+ qF¦F . (3.6)
The manager’s expected utility if she complies with the contractual e¤ort level is
UF =
£
1¡ p(eF )¤ £W +R(IFD)¡ I ¡ qFmF ¡ rF IFD¤+ qF¦F ¡ eF . (3.7)
18 It does not make any di¤erence whether a bank or an insurance company assumes this function. We use
the term “insurer” to cover both.
19The superscript “F” indicates the case with …nancial responsibility.
20Note that there are no reasons for distortions in the capital or debt structure, so that we can safely write
I¤D, and neglect c
i since min(cB ; cP ) = 0.
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If no accident occurs, the manager keeps her wealth W and the value of the …rm R(IFD),
but she has invested E¤, qFmF , and (1 + rF )IFD as upfront payments. If she is monitored,
she receives additionally qF¦F , and she bears e¤ort costs eF in any case.
Let ev be the manger’s utility maximizing e¤ort if she deviates from eF . Her expected
utility Uv is then
Uv = [1¡ p(ev)] £1¡ qF )¤ £W +R(IFD)¡ I ¡mF ¡ rF IFD¤¡ ev, (3.8)
since the gets the term in brackets only if no accident occurs and if she is not monitored.
It follows that the manager complies if UF ¸ Uv, or if
eF ¡ ev < £¡1¡ p(eF )¢¡ (1¡ p(ev)) (1¡ qF )¤ £W +R(IFD)¡ I ¡mF ¡ rF IFD¤+ qF¦F .
(3.9)
The incentive constraint (3.9) shows that a su¢cient condition for the manager to comply
is that eF ¡ ev < qF¦F .21 Clearly, this can be reached by choosing qF¦F high enough.
Furthermore, qF and¦F are perfect substitutes with respect to the manager’s incentive. Since
monitoring is costly whereas the premium is only a redistribution, in the optimal contract
qF is chosen arbitrarily small to save monitoring costs, and ¦F is adjusted accordingly to
ful…ll the manger’s incentive constraint.22 Finally, the manager proposes the contract that
maximizes their joint surplus. Since the insurer’s expected pro…t is zero in equilibrium, this
joint surplus is identical to the manager’s utility UF . Substituting (3.5) into (3.7)
UF =W +R(IFD)¡ I ¡ p(eF )L¡ eF ¡ qFmF . (3.10)
It follows that the e¤ort written in the contract is strictly increasing in the liability
payment L, because the monitoring costsmF required to guarantee that the manager actually
chooses the contractual e¤ort level are arbitrarily small (regardless of the e¤ort level itself).
This leads immediately to
Proposition 2. Regardless of the manager’s wealth, the optimal liability regime is full …-
nancial responsibility (L = D).
Proof: See Appendix.
The logic of this result is the following. When monitoring is introduced, it is possible to
reward the manager not only for the fact that no accident happened, but also if the e¤ort
observed by the monitor is indeed compliant with the standard. We introduced the bonus
payment ¦¤ to do this trick. By giving very high-powed bonus payments ¦¤ if the …rm is
21
£¡
1¡ p(eF )¢ ¡ (1¡ p(ev)) (1¡ qF )¤ £W +R(I¤D)¡ E ¡mF ¡ (1 + rF )I¤D¤ is non-negative.
22This idea goes back to Becker (1968) who emphasized that the detection probability and the …ne are
substitutes when deterring potential criminals.
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monitored and found compliant, the monitoring costs can be chosen approximately close to
zero since only the expected bonus qF¦¤ matters. Thus, monitoring costs can be neglected,
and we can conclude that …nancial responsibility allows to get arbitrarily close to the …rst
best allocation. But then, the choice of L should be such that eF = e¤ is chosen. This
is precisely the case if L = D, i.e. if the court decides on full liability, since the manager’s
objective function under the optimal contract will then just coincide with the maximization of
the social surplus. Hence, the bonus payment solves the problems caused by limited liability.
3.3. Lender Liability
Now consider the e¤ect of lender liability that is not backed up by the requirement to prove
mandatory coverage. The capital structure decision may now be distorted because of the
unequal treatment of private and public debt: Only bank …nanced …rms have to fully inter-
nalize the environmental risk. Two distortions can emerge: …rst, public debt …rms will use
too much debt and exercise too little care because of the lacking imposition of social costs.
Second, some …rms which should use bank debt because of cB < cP will now …nd it privately
optimal to switch to public debt to free ride on parts of the social costs of their activities.
This is the debt structure bias of lender liability.
Suppose the …rm continues to use bank debt in spite of this handicap. Then everything
is identical to …nancial responsibility: the manager uses her initial wealth as deductible, and
chooses the optimal contract according to Propostion 2, with eF = e¤ and q¤ ! 0. Her utility
is then again23
ULB =W +R(I
¤
D)¡ I ¡ p(e¤)L¡ e¤. (3.11)
On the other hand, if the …rm uses public debt, its objective function is the same as under
strict liability only, because liability is not extended to third parties:
ULP =W +
£
1¡ p(eS)¤ £R(ISD)¡ ISD¤¡ES ¡ eS ¡ cP . (3.12)
Therefore, as long as the cost advantage of bank debt is small, the possibility to evade
liability by choosing dispersed public debt will dominate, and the outcome is comparable to
strict liability. It follows
Proposition 3. With lender liability, we get the following results:
(i) If cB ¸ cP , then public debt is preferred and the same distortions as under strict
liability arise: underprovision of care, overleverage, and overinvestment.
23Superscript “L” indicates lender liability. Recall that min(cB ; cP ) = 0, and that a necessary condition
for using bank debt is that cB < cP .
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(ii) If cB < cP and if the cost advantage is overcompensated by the limited liability e¤ect,
then public debt is preferred. A distortion in the debt structure arises in addition to the
ine¢ciencies listed under (i).
(iii) If cB < cP and if bank debt is optimal, then the …rst best is achieved as under
…nancial responsibility.
Proof: Part (i): Follows from tha analysis of strict liability. Parts (ii) and (iii): Follow
from the comparisons of equations (3.11) and (3.12). ¥
3.4. Comparison of the Liability Rules
The main result of our analysis is that …nancial responsibility either leads to the …rst best
allocation (if the manager’s wealth is su¢ciently high) or comes arbitrarily close to that (if
her wealth is too low for self-insurance) if the regulator requires full liability, L = D. This
striking di¤erence to the literature is explained by the fact that our contract proposes the
optimal combination of contract penalties and bonus payments in response to the …ndings of
the monitoring: The proponents of restricted liability argue that in the presence of agency
costs, the trade-o¤ between improving the risk internalization (by increasing L toward D)
and the rising agency costs leads to an internal optimum. In our model, safety monitoring
is introduced, and we show that with the optimal contract, almost no agency costs m (for
monitoring the manager) are required. It follows that full liability (L = D) is optimal.
By contrast, both strict liability alone and lender liability lead to distortions: The limited
liability e¤ect is present under strict liability, and also under lender liability if banks are not
substantially more cost e¢cient. In fact, the relative ranking between strict liability and
lender liability is ambiguous. On the one hand, for …rms which prefer bank debt under both
regimes, e¢ciency is improved through lender liability because they are now internalizing the
environmental risk in their investment and care decisions. On the other hand, for …rms which
prefer bank debt under strict liability but are induced to switch to public debt, e¢ciency
will deteriorate because the environmental risk will still only be partially internalized, and
there will be an additional loss from using a less preferable capital structure. Finally, …rms
preferring public debt under both regimes will see no change in their incentives.
4. Risk Aversion
The optimal liability rule proposed in Proposition 2 relies on the assumption of risk neutrality.
The optimal contract was based on the highest possible remuneration ¦F if the manager was
monitored and found compliant. As the monitoring probability qF was reduced to zero, the
reward ¦F paid to a compliant management (if monitored) was raised towards in…nity.
In this Section, we discuss to what extent our …ndings are robust if we allow for risk aver-
sion of the manager. Risk aversion means that it is not possible any more, in a sequence where
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qF converges to zero, to keep the manager’s utility constant without raising the expected cost
of the bonus, qF¦F .
To derive the optimal amount of of damages L, we compare the manager’s optimization
problem expressed above to the social planner’s objective function. To deduce the second-
best optimal contract, we need to assume that the planner could not only choose L, but also
a monitoring level m and incentive payments to the manager for all possible outcomes of
monitoring and harm. The planner would choose these instruments such that the manager
behaves second-best e¢cient. The question is then whether a liability level L exists that sets
incentives for the manager to implement the same allocation via an insurance contract.
As before and as in the analysis of Pitchford (1995), we …rst maintain the assumption
that changes in the liability rule have two simultaneous e¤ects: they alter incentives for e¤ort
prevention, and they alter the income distrbution or the net wealth of the manager. That is,
we assume that it is not possible to engineer a …xed transfer of funds, say via a tax from the
potential victims of an accident to the manager, in order to neutralize the income distribution
e¤ect of the liability rule.
We will argue informally that in this case, the optimal liability rule would be partial
…nancial responsibility, L < D. To understand the reason, we need to look the e¤ects as one
considers to gradually increase the liability L towards D. This will induce two countervailing
e¤ects: the positive e¤ect is an amelioration in the incentives for the insurer to invest into
monitoring. The negative e¤ect is the increase in the expected liability and the insurance
premium, which leaves less to the manager if no accident occurs or if no e¤ort deviation is
detected. The optimum L¤ is reached when the cost from second e¤ect becomes as important
as the bene…t from the …rst e¤ect, and this optimum must be strictly below D because the
…rst e¤ect vanishes as L ! D. Thus, the reason why partial liability is optimal is that
changes in the liability rule entail wealth e¤ects which, by assumption, cannot be neutralized
by a redistributive policy. The optimality of partial liability in the model of Pitchford (1995)
requires similarly that income redistribution is not possible.24
To emphasize the critical role of the assumption on the possibility of income transfers we
will turn to a formal analysis of the case where this assumption is relaxed. That is, we now
explicitly allow for the possibility that the liability rule is determined jointly with a scheme of
transfering money between victims and manager. Note that this transfer scheme could either
be the outcome of state-mandated …scal policy, or be the result of e¢cient private bargaining
between victims and manager.
To keep the notation simple, we assume without loss of generality that the manager’s
expected utility is separable in money and e¤ort and exhibits risk aversion only in its money
24A simple way of seeing this is that if direct bargaining between victims and manager were possible in
Pitchford’s model, then welfare-increasing, Coasian bargaining would always be possible. The victims would
o¤er a direct transfer to the manager in exchange for accepting full liability (via a private contract recognizing
complementary liability).
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component, while it is risk neutral in e¤ort. Consider then a risk-averse manager with a
(concave) utility function U(:) ¡ e who receives all the surplus of running the …rm. We
normalize the manager’s lowest monetary utility level to U(0) = 0.25 Two well-known e¤ects
will emerge with this transition. First, since the manager is risk averse, introducing liability
insurance will always allow for better risk sharing whenever the insurer is less risk averse.
Second, introducing insurance reduces the manager’s e¤ort incentives. The trade-o¤ between
insurance and incentives explains that the …rst best can no longer be achieved. We are
therefore looking for a second best.which is a pure wealrth e¤ect, is negative and explains
why the optimum
As with risk-neutrality, the manager will suggest an insurance contract that maximizes
her own and the insurer’s joint surplus, subject to her incentive constraint and the insurer’s
participation constraint.26 The optimal contract will again consist of three di¤erent state-
contingent payments from the insurer to the manager: A payment ¦I1 if the manager is
monitored and found compliant, a payment ¦I2 if there is no monitoring and no accident, and
a pament ¦I3 if there is an accident, but there was no monitoring. Clearly, ¦
I
1 > ¦
I
2 ¸ ¦I3.27
The income transfer that is now possible by assumption takes the form of a lump-sum tax
¦
I
> 0 that the victims need to pay to the manager, independently of the outcome concerning
accident and monitoring (respectively a lump-sum subsidy that victims receive if ¦
I
< 0).
These payments must guarantee that the insurer breaks even in expectation.
Now suppose that the liability rule is …xed at L. The problem for a manager of designing
the optimal insurance contract can then be written as:
max
¦I1;¦
I
2;¦
I
3
qU(¦I1) + (1¡ q)(1¡ p(e))U(¦I2) + (1¡ q)p(e)U(¦I3)¡ e¡ qm, (4.1)
subject to the insurer’s participation constraint
q¦I1 + (1¡ q)(1¡ p(e))¦I2 + (1¡ q)p(e)¦I3 =W +R(ID)¡ I ¡ p(e)L+¦I , (4.2)
and the …rm’s incentive constraint
q(¦I1) + (1¡ q)(1¡ p(e))U(¦I2) + (1¡ q)p(e)U(¦I3)¡ e (4.3)
¸ (1¡ q)(1¡ p(ev))U(¦I2) + (1¡ q)p(ev)U(¦I3)¡ ev :
25Since D can be interpreted as the monetary certainty equivalent of the utility losses of the victims, so we
do not need to specify their risk attitude.
26The reason is again that capital and insurance markets are competitive, so that the manager bears the
agency costs.
27The only di¤erence to our earlier exposition is that we do not state the insurance premium (1 + r)ID
explicitly. Instead, (1 + r)ID is part of the expected payments ¦I1, ¦
I
2 and ¦
I
3.
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Also, since transfers are now possible, we stipulate that in addition the social planner
decides to impose a lump-sum tax ¦
I
that the insurer needs to pay (respectively a lump-sum
subsidy if ¦
I
< 0), independently of the outcome concerning accident and monitoring. These
payments must guarantee that the insurer breaks even in expectation.
A closer look at the insurer’s problem (4.1) - (4.3) shows that this problem is congruent to
the planner’s problem (5.3) - (5.4): Both will have the same solution if the same parameters
are chosen, that is L = D; as well as ¦Ii = ¦
P
i ; for i = 1; 2; 3 and …nally ¹¦
I = ¹¦P for the
lump-sum transfer. We …nd then and prove in the Appendix that:
Proposition 4 (Risk Aversion). If the manager is risk averse, then a liability regime of
…nancial responsibility coupled with full liability L = D, and possibly a lump-sum transfer
¹¦I , is optimal.
This analysis con…rms and generalizes our main …nding, that the optimal liability regime
is …nancial responsibility and a level of damages L = D. To repeat the intuition, imposing
full liability L = D is necessary to make sure that the insurer proposes indeed the steepness
of the manager’s incentives that guarantees Pareto e¢cient e¤ort levels. The introduction of
monitoring allows to use bonus payments in case of compliance as the main incentive instru-
ment instead of penalties for the manager if an accident occurs. This additional dimension
in the contracting space makes the argument in favor of partial liability largely redundant.
To put it di¤erently, the optimal liability regime should still be full …nancial responsibil-
ity, because, as long as compensating wealth transfers are permitted, monitoring allows to
e¢ciently shift the burden of incentive schemes from the “stick” in the case of an accident to
the “carrot” in the case of compliance.
5. Conclusion
We compared …nancial responsibility, strict liability without extension, and lender liability
in a model where the manager can …nance the project through equity (out of her wealth),
publicly ‡oated debt and bank debt. Lenders and insurers can perform audits to mitigate
the moral hazard problem with respect to the manager’s e¤ort.
We demonstrate that …nancial responsibility is superior to each other regime. Under
…nancial responsibility, the e¢cient care level is chosen, and the agency costs of monitoring
can be reduced to a negligible quantity, if contracts are optimized. The social welfare can
then attain the …rst best.
There are three driving forces behind our …ndings. First, the manager voluntarily invests
her total wealth as deductible and insurance premium to reduce agency costs. Second, …nan-
cial responsibility avoids distortions in the capital structure. Third, the agent chooses the
optimal monitor independently of the capital structure. If partial liability is applied instead,
distortions in the capital or debt structure are inevitable: the lower the level of extended
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liability, the higher the bias towards debt instead of equity. However, the higher the level of
lender liability, the higher the incentive to substitute bank credits by publicly ‡oated debt.
These distortions together with well developed monitoring technologies lead to the conclusion
that …nancial responsibility is referable.
Certainly, one may remain skeptical whether the reduction of monitoring costs to an
arbitrarily small amount is possible in practice. In our view, this feature of the optimal con-
tract nonetheless captures an important aspect of the reality of environmental audits: Since
…rms so often voluntarily engage in contracts with their insurers where they are routinely
monitored, they demonstrate by revealed preferences that in practice, the bene…t of imple-
menting the e¢cient care level typically more than dominates the additional agency costs of
continuous safety monitoring.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.
Since the insurance market is competitive, for each choice of bonus ¦F the competitive
(or fair) premium rF will be
rF =
p(eF )
1¡ p(eF )
£
L¡W ¡R(IFD) + I
¤
IFD
(5.1)
For any given level eF , consider all pairs (qF ;¦F ) such that the ensuing fair premium
rF satis…es (5.1), and such that incentive constraint (3.9) holds with equality. Inspection of
(3.9) reveals that all pairs (qF ;¦F ) where the product qF ¢¦F is identical will ensure that the
manager prefers eF over any other care level. Thus, among all pairs (qF ;¦F ) with identical
product qF ¢¦F , the one maximizing welfare will be optimal. But then consider the sequence
of all pairs all pairs (qF ;¦F ) with identical product qF ¢ ¦F where ¦F !1: obviously, the
limit pointalong this sequence must have qF ! 0. It follows that qF can be chosen arbitrarily
close to zero. But then, monitoring costs qFmF can also be chosen arbitrarily close to zero.
Thus, in the limit the optimal care level eF and capital strucutre IFD will be the maximizer
of utility expression (3.10), which becomes
UF =W +R(IFD)¡ I ¡ p(e)D ¡ e
and hence eF ! e¤ and IFD ! I¤D as ¦¤ ! 1, demonstrating that an arbitrary close
approximation of the …rst best allocation can be achieved. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4: Let ¦P1 , ¦
P
2 and ¦
P
3 denote the monetary payments to the
manager that the social planner would dictate in analogy to the payments in the insureance
contracts, i.e. ¦P1 is received if monitored and found compliant, ¦
P
2 if there is no monitoring
and no accident, and ¦P3 if there is an accident, but there was no monitoring. Let ¹¦
P denote
the expected di¤erence between the (state-contingent) insurance premia and the expected
harm,
¹¦P ´ q¦P1 + (1¡ q)(1¡ p(e))¦P2 + (1¡ q)p(e)¦P3 ¡ (R(ID)¡ I +W )¡ p(e)D. (5.2)
The planner uses the Pareto criterion. Using the utility function of the victims as the nu-
meraire in the planner’s objective function and denoting the (arbitrary) weight that the
planner gives to the utility of the manager by ¹, the planner’s objective function can be
written as:
¹
£
qU(¦P1 ) + (1¡ q)(1¡ p(e))U(¦P2 ) + (1¡ q)p(e)U(¦P3 )¡ e¡ qm
¤ ¡ p(e)D ¡ ¹¦P , (5.3)
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subject to the …rm’s incentive constraint
qU(¦P1 ) + (1¡ q)(1¡ p(e))U(¦P2 ) + (1¡ q)p(e)U(¦P3 )¡ e (5.4)
¸ (1¡ q)(1¡ p(ev))U(¦P2 ) + (1¡ q)p(ev)U(¦P3 )¡ ev .
In this solution, the planner can dictate the manager’s …nal payo¤ in each of the relevant
states. This program will give rise to the second best e¤ort level es. The incentive constraint
(5.4) illustrates that the manager will only take her private cost into account, which for a
marginal increase in e¤ort is equal to (1¡ q)(1¡ p(e))U(¦P2 ) + (1¡ q)p(e)U(¦P3 ). Thus, less
e¤ort can be implemented at the margin than would be in the …rst best, i.e. es < e¤.
The planner …xes instruments (¦P1 ; ¦
P
2 ; ¦
P
3 ) and ¹¦
P so as to maximize the entire social
objective function, ¹ [:] ¡ p(e)D ¡ ¹¦P ¡ e ¡m: For any level of ¹¦P chosen and any target
level of e there is a triple ¦P1 , ¦
P
2 ; ¦
P
3 which is optimal, i.e. o¤ers best possible ris sharing
while giving incetnves that the manager chooses e. Call the ensuing level of expected utility
of the manager EU(¹¦P ; e).
Thus, the planners problem can be more simply rewritten as:
max
¹¦P ;e
¹ (EU(¹¦P ; e)¡ e¡ qm) ¡ p(e)D ¡ ¹¦P : (5.5)
The …rst order condition with respect to ¹¦P is:
@ EU
@ ¹¦P
=
1
¹
(5.6)
and the …rst order condition with respect to ¹¦P is:
@ EU
@ e
= 1 +
p0D
¹
(5.7)
There are then optimal instruments (¦P1 ; ¦
P
2 ; ¦
P
3 ) and ¹¦
P solving these conditions and
inducing the second-best e¤ort eS .
dNow consider the insurer’s problem of proposing the optimal insurance contract. Suppose
that the planner has chosen to impose the optimal instruments, and ¹¦I = ¹¦P , as well as
L = D. The insurer’s problem can then be written as a Langrangian of the form:
max
(¦I1;¦
I
2;¦
I
3)
L = qU(¦I1) + (1¡ q)(1¡ p(e))U(¦I2) + (1¡ q)p(e)U(¦I3)¡ e¡ qm
¡¸1
³
q¦I1 + (1¡ q)(1¡ p(e))¦I2 + (1¡ q)p(e)¦I3 ¡W ¡R(ID) + I + p(e)D ¡¦P
´
¡¸2
¡
qU(¦P1 ) + (1¡ q)(1¡ p(e))U(¦P2 ) + (1¡ q)p(e)U(¦P3 )¡ e¡ (1¡ q)(1¡ p(ev))U(¦I2)¡ (1¡
We can use the same trick as for the social planner and represent directly the induced
expected utility EU(¹¦I ; e) that the insurer can optimally propose to the manager, where
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¹¦I = q¦I1 + (1¡ q)(1¡ p(e))¦I2 + (1¡ q)p(e)¦I3 ¡W ¡R(ID) + I + p(e)D is a given level of
expected net payments to the manager and e is the target care level. In this representation,
the incentive constraint is implicitly contained in the expression EU(¹¦P ; e) and the second
constraint can be omitted. Thus, the insurer’s problem becomes:
max
¹¦I ;e
L = EU(¹¦I ; e)¡ e¡ qm (5.8)
¡¸1
³
¹¦I + p(e)D ¡¦P
´
The …rst order conditions are:
@ EU
@ ¹¦I
= ¸1 (5.9)
and the …rst order condition with respect to ¹¦P is:
@ EU
@ e
= 1 + ¸1 p
0D (5.10)
Moreover, since the insurance market is competitive, the equilibirum insurance contract
satis…es ¹¦I +p(e)D = ¦
P
: Clearly then, choosing ¸1 = 1¹ shows that the system of equations
(5.5)-(5.7) gives exactly the same solution as the system (5.8)-(5.10), since they are collinear.
¥
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Eberhard: References: change Becker, Bergkamp, Boyd, Endres, Feess, Feess-
Hege, Shavell (1997), Newman and Wright (1992)
redundant: Boyd-Ingberman (1995), Schwartz.
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